Active wars: eight concurrent armed conflicts reshaping world order

What it is

"Active wars" as a beat covers large-scale organized armed conflicts, those producing at least 1,000 battle deaths in a calendar year by the Uppsala University Conflict Data Program (UCDP) benchmark, together with conflicts generating humanitarian crises of comparable scale. The eight theaters on this tracker span four continents and five structural types: great-power competition (Russia-Ukraine), nuclear-adjacent proxy conflict (Iran-Gulf), occupation and resistance (Gaza-Israel), state collapse and militia fragmentation (Sudan, Sahel, DR Congo, Somalia), and coup-driven civil war (Myanmar). ACLED recorded more than 550 political-violence incidents daily in 2025 worldwide, with air and drone strikes at an all-time high. These eight theaters account for the bulk of that toll.

History

The post-Cold War decades saw interstate wars recede but intrastate and proxy conflicts multiply. Russia's 2014 annexation of Ukraine's Crimea peninsula and its proxy war in the Donbas opened the Ukraine chapter; the full-scale invasion launched on February 24, 2022. Myanmar's military junta seized power in a coup on February 1, 2021, triggering a resistance movement that hardened into a nationwide civil war. Hamas attacked Israel on October 7, 2023, and Israel's subsequent ground and aerial campaign in Gaza reshaped the entire Middle East order, activating Houthi Red Sea strikes and proxy surges from Lebanon to Iraq. Sudan's war between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) erupted in Khartoum in April 2023 after a political transition collapsed. The Sahel insurgency traces to northern Mali in 2012, then spread through Burkina Faso, Niger, and Chad; it accelerated after coups in Mali in 2021, Burkina Faso in 2022, and Niger in 2023 expelled French forces and invited Wagner's Africa Corps. Somalia's al-Shabaab has controlled territory in southern Somalia since 2006. The DRC's M23 insurgency reached its most destructive phase when Goma fell in January 2025.

Current state

As of July 2026, all eight theaters remain active. Russia struck Kyiv on July 2 with more than 570 drones and missiles (see ロシアがウクライナに戦争最大規模のミサイル・ドローン570機を一斉発射). Ukraine is simultaneously expanding domestic arms production and international export channels (see ウクライナ、2022年の侵攻開始以来初めて管理された武器輸出を解禁). US-Iran nuclear talks in Doha reached a conclusion in early July 2026 (see ドーハでの米イラン協議が終了、ホルムズと凍結資産で前進も核協議はハメネイ師葬儀後に持ち越し and ドーハ協議は「前向きな進展」で終了、核問題は議題に上がらず、ホルムズ緊張緩和は7月4-5日に失効); whether a durable agreement holds will determine Gulf proxy-war funding through 2027 (see ウィットコフとクシュナー、イラン覚書交渉のためドーハへ、米イラン直接会談は未確認). Strait of Hormuz oil-flow risk stayed elevated into summer 2026 (see ホルムズ海峡の想定より速い再開通が石油供給過剰リスクを高める、中国が輸入削減). Sudan's RSF pressed its siege of El Fasher, the last SAF-held urban center in Darfur, through June 2026, with the UN warning of imminent mass-atrocity risk. Myanmar's ruling junta reshuffled its senior command in late June 2026 as the Brotherhood Alliance coalition stalled after early 2026 territorial gains in Sagaing and Chin states. Somalia's al-Shabaab launched a major Shabelle River valley offensive against the African Union Transition Mission (ATMIS) in June 2026.

Relationships

The eight wars are not isolated. Russia's invasion re-armed European states and diverted global arms supply chains toward Kyiv (see ウクライナ、2022年の侵攻開始以来初めて管理された武器輸出を解禁). The Iran-Gaza-Houthi-Hezbollah axis links the Middle East theaters directly to global energy: a Strait of Hormuz closure would cut roughly 20 percent of global seaborne oil from world markets (see ホルムズ海峡の想定より速い再開通が石油供給過剰リスクを高める、中国が輸入削減). Wagner's Africa Corps ties the Sahel, Libya, Sudan, and the Central African Republic into a single Russian-backed security architecture. China is the primary arms supplier to Myanmar's junta and the SAF in Sudan. The DRC, Sudan, Myanmar, and Somalia together hold four of the ten largest forced-displacement crises globally as of mid-2026, shaping donor budgets, refugee policy in neighboring states, and UN Security Council agendas.

What to watch

• Whether the US-Iran Doha framework produces a durable agreement, which would reshape Gulf proxy funding, Houthi Red Sea operations, and Iranian influence in Gaza.
• Russia's battlefield tempo in Ukraine before the autumn mud season, and NATO member states' ability to sustain ammunition supply through 2027.
• Sudan's RSF siege of El Fasher: a fall would effectively partition Sudan and trigger a Darfur famine the UN has compared in scale to the 2003-2005 crisis.
• Myanmar's junta cohesion after the June 2026 command reshuffle, and whether the Brotherhood Alliance can consolidate territorial gains before any ceasefire negotiation.
• ATMIS's scheduled exit from Somalia by December 2026, and whether the Somali National Army can prevent al-Shabaab from retaking Shabelle corridor towns after the drawdown.