Conflict in the Central African Republic

What it is

The Central African Republic (CAR) conflict is a protracted multi-party armed conflict that has dominated CAR's politics and economy since 2013. The primary fault line runs between the Bangui government, backed since 2018 by Russian paramilitaries, and a rotating cast of rebel coalitions rooted in the Seleka umbrella and the anti-balaka militias that formed against it. MINUSCA, the UN peacekeeping mission established in 2014, operates alongside government forces under a Chapter VII mandate. The conflict is inseparable from competition for CAR's gold, diamond, and timber resources, particularly in the east and southeast where state authority is thin.

History

The modern conflict dates to December 2012, when the Seleka coalition, a predominantly Muslim armed alliance from CAR's north, launched an offensive against President François Bozizé. Seleka seized Bangui and staged a coup in March 2013. Christian and animist anti-balaka militias formed in response, triggering sectarian mass atrocities on both sides. International peacekeepers arrived, and elections in 2016 brought Faustin-Archange Touadéra to the presidency. Armed groups never fully demobilised. In December 2020, six factions, including units loyal to ex-president Bozizé, formed the Coalition of Patriots for Change (CPC) and launched an offensive that nearly reached Bangui in January 2021. Russian Wagner Group mercenaries, deployed from late 2020, repelled the CPC advance alongside MINUSCA and Rwandan troops.

Current state

As of mid-2026, the conflict has partially wound down but remains live on the periphery. In July 2025, the Union for Peace in the Central African Republic (UPC) and the Return, Reclamation and Rehabilitation (3R) movement formally disbanded in a ceremony with President Touadéra, with more than 1,200 combatants demobilised. Russia in August 2025 asked CAR to replace the Wagner Group with Africa Corps, a unit under the direct command of Russia's defence ministry. Touadéra won a third presidential term in December 2025 with more than 53% of the vote; the same elections included the first local ballots in 36 years. The eastern front remains volatile: in January 2026 the Azande Ani Kpi Gbe (AAKG) militia clashed with CAR government forces in Zémio, Haut-Mbomou, causing civilian casualties and displacement into the DRC and South Sudan. The CPC, still led by Bozizé, remains armed. The CAR Special Criminal Court (SCC) continued to function in 2025, with six FPRC members receiving sentences of 18 to 25 years and two anti-balaka leaders convicted by the International Criminal Court. Approximately 750,000 CAR refugees remain in neighbouring countries, mainly Cameroon and the DRC, and more than 500,000 are internally displaced. About 70% of CAR's population lives in extreme poverty.

Relationships

The CAR conflict is a direct node in Russia's Africa footprint. Wagner mercenaries secured access to CAR's gold and diamond mines in exchange for military support, a transactional model since replicated in Sudan, Mali, and Libya. MINUSCA, with roughly 15,000 uniformed personnel, has operated under a Chapter VII mandate since 2014. Rwanda also maintains bilateral troops in CAR under a separate security agreement. The Bozizé-era CPC retains cross-border networks into Chad and South Sudan. The January 2026 clashes in Haut-Mbomou are the sharpest active expression of this insurgency and a stress test of whether partial disarmament can hold without reaching all peripheral armed groups.

What to watch

• Whether the AAKG and the remaining CPC factions enter any formal disarmament framework
• The operational transition from Wagner to Africa Corps, and what mineral-access arrangements it involves
• SCC prosecutions and further ICC case transfers to CAR's domestic courts
• Cross-border displacement pressure on the DRC and South Sudan
• Whether Touadéra's third term translates state authority beyond Bangui into the east