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Turkey secretly sold its Russian-made S-400 air defence systems to a Gulf state, Hürriyet reports

Turkish newspaper Hürriyet, citing senior defence columnist Abdulkadir Selvi, reported on July 10 that Turkey had already completed the sale of its Russian-made S-400 systems to a Gulf state, most likely the UAE or Qatar; an official announcement was expected the same day; analysts and Greek media said the sale could reopen negotiations for Turkey to obtain US-made F-35 jets, from which Ankara has been excluded since 2019

Defence·Leaders· active The Quiet Shift·Whose Money ·23 takes · ·rbtfl upd Jul 11, 2026
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The split

The same story, as told by newsrooms in different countries. Their words, attributed and linked.

Greece

Athens Times

“Hürriyet reports Turkey's S-400 systems have been sold to a Gulf state, potentially clearing a path for renewed F-35 talks, though no official confirmation yet.”

Greek security-policy perspective, F-35 implicationsread the original ↗

India

India TV News

“A report by a local Turkish newspaper has said that Ankara has sold its S-400 air defence systems, which it purchased from Russia in 2017, to a Gulf nation, which is likely the UAE or Qatar.”

South Asian defence-import perspectiveread the original ↗

United States

Forbes

“The UAE could bolster its multilayered air-defense network by acquiring Turkey's unused S-400 systems, which have been in storage since delivery without ever being activated.”

US defence and foreign policy analysis; identifies the UAE as the most likely buyer given its existing multilayered air-defence architecture; frames the sale as fitting into Gulf state efforts to diversify beyond US systemsread the original ↗

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Summary

Turkey has sold the Russian-made S-400 surface-to-air missile systems it purchased in 2017 to a Gulf state, most likely the UAE or Qatar, according to Hürriyet's senior defence columnist Abdulkadir Selvi, who reported the deal was concluded and an official announcement was expected July 10. Turkey purchased four divisions of the S-400 from Russia for approximately US$2.5 billion, and the acquisition triggered Ankara's expulsion from the US F-35 program in 2019. At the NATO Ankara summit on July 7, US President Donald Trump signalled F-35s could be offered to Turkey, and analysts in Greece and India read the S-400 disposal as the necessary precondition for that deal to proceed. Neither the Turkish government, the US, nor any named Gulf state had officially confirmed the transaction in available reporting.

The split

Turkey's pro-government Hürriyet framed the sale as Erdogan's diplomatic triumph, opening the F-35 pathway. Turkey's opposition press, including Turkish Minute, noted Erdogan publicly avoided the S-400 question at the NATO summit while Trump left Ankara without committing to the F-35, saying "haven't totally made up my mind." Russia's Kremlin, via Peskov, confirmed talks and described the matter as "extremely sensitive," signalling Moscow expects leverage in approving any transfer under the 2017 end-user clause. US hawks at FDD and JINSA argued CAATSA lifting does not automatically unlock the F-35, pointing to the separate NDAA Section 1245 bar and noting that placing a Russian radar system near US Gulf bases recreates the same detection-risk that led to Turkey's 2019 expulsion from the programme. India's defence press spotted an unintended consequence: Turkey's CAATSA resolution sets a precedent that effectively covers India's own US$5.43 billion S-400 deal, which has never been sanctioned.

By the numbers

  • US$2.5 billion, Turkey's original 2017 purchase price for four S-400 divisions from Russia
  • 7 years, Turkey held the systems before the reported sale
  • 2019, year Turkey was excluded from the F-35 program over the S-400

Why it matters

The S-400 has been the central obstacle in Turkey-US defence ties since 2019 and a recurring source of NATO Alliance tension. The disposal, if finalised with Russian consent, removes the primary stated bar to Turkey's F-35 acquisition and resolves NATO's concern about Russian radar signatures. Two legal locks remain: CAATSA lifting is Trump's executive action; NDAA Section 1245 is a Congressional statute requiring formal certification that Turkey no longer possesses the system, with no presidential waiver. India, holding US$5.43 billion of the same Russian hardware, watches closely: Turkey's resolution is an unintended precedent that effectively resolves India's own CAATSA exposure without India needing to divest a single system.

What to watch

  • Erdogan's official announcement of the sale and the buyer's identity, expected imminently; absence this week signals Russia is still extracting concessions
  • Whether Russia formally confirms consent under the end-user clause, without which no transfer is legally complete
  • Whether NDAA Section 1245 certification is submitted to Congress, the step that actually unlocks F-35 transfer authority
  • How India responds publicly to Turkey's CAATSA resolution, which sets a precedent for its own Russian hardware

The briefing, by email