Guinea capped bauxite exports at 150 million tonnes per year, cutting ~25% from 2025 run-rate, as Chalco opened a $1B alumina refinery at Boffa

Summary

The Republic of Guinea issued Ministerial Order 2026/MMG/CAB/0447 on June 1, 2026, capping annual bauxite exports at 150 million dry metric tonnes, approximately 25% below Guinea's 2025 export run-rate of around 200 million tonnes. The order cites resource conservation and price stabilisation: Guinea's bauxite export price had fallen roughly 50% from early-2025 peaks as the country's producers flooded the market. The cap is imposed across all concession holders, including CBG, SMB-Winning and Winning Consortium Simandou. The same week, Aluminium Corporation of China subsidiary Chalco opened a $1 billion alumina refinery at Boffa on June 13, 2026, with 1 million tonnes per year of alumina nameplate capacity; since the export restriction applies to bauxite ore and not alumina, Chalco's refinery is structurally exempt and its supply chain is insulated. Separately, British Virgin Islands-registered Axis International filed a $28.9 billion ICSID arbitration against Guinea in March 2026 following the revocation of its Boké region exploration permits. Guinea supplies 75.3% of China's bauxite imports, and a 25% volume reduction would remove the equivalent of 6-8 weeks of Chinese alumina refinery feedstock.

The split

The Guinean government frames the export cap as a conservation and price-support measure: with bauxite prices 50% below early-2025 levels, the state was watching its primary mineral revenue base erode while producers raced each other to volume. Supporters of the cap in Guinea's civil society add that China's extraction of raw ore without in-country refining captured minimal domestic value, and that Chalco's Boffa refinery is the model the cap is designed to incentivise. Chinese industry observers and trade media (Alcircle) focus on the supply-chain disruption: 75% of Chinese bauxite imports from one politically volatile source creates a feedstock concentration risk now crystallising. Australian miners (Rio Tinto Weipa, South32 Worsley) see the cap as a medium-term demand pull for their product, but Australian bauxite quality and logistics do not substitute Guinean supply at 12-month notice. The Axis International $28.9B arbitration is the largest-known claim filed against Guinea; its merit turns on whether Doumbouya's permit revocations comply with the UK-Guinea BIT and ICSID rules, which Guinea has contested vigorously in prior arbitrations.

By the numbers

• 150Mt, Guinea's new annual bauxite export ceiling (effective June 1, 2026).
• ~200Mt, Guinea's estimated 2025 annual bauxite exports.
• ~25%, implied reduction from the 2025 run-rate under the new cap.
• ~50%, decline in Guinean bauxite export prices from early-2025 peaks.
• 75.3%, Guinea's share of China's bauxite imports in 2025.
• $1B, Chalco's Boffa alumina refinery investment (opened June 13, 2026).
• 1 million tpa, Boffa refinery alumina nameplate (2 million tpa planned by 2028).
• $28.9B, Axis International's ICSID arbitration claim against Guinea (filed March 2026).

Why it matters

Guinea holds the world's largest bauxite reserves. The June 2026 export cap is the most direct supply constraint the Doumbouya government has imposed on the bauxite sector, more structural than the EGA-GAC concession dispute resolved in May 2026. For China, which processes Guinea's ore into aluminium via its coastal and inland refinery network, a 25% volume cut is not immediately acute if strategic stockpiles hold, but it accelerates pressure to diversify feedstock sources and to invest in in-country refining, which Chalco has already done at Boffa. For Western aluminium producers (EGA, Rusal, Alcoa), the cap tightens global bauxite availability and puts upward pressure on CIF prices for non-Chinese buyers, who compete in a thinner ex-Guinea market. The Axis International arbitration, if it proceeds, will test whether Guinea's BIT obligations constrain the government's ability to revoke permits granted under prior administrations, a question that matters for every legacy mining concession in the country.

What to watch

• How Guinea allocates the 150Mt cap across concession holders: whether pro-rata or discretionary allocation advantages Chinese-backed SMB-Winning over CBG and Western-held concessions.
• Bauxite spot price response to the cap: whether prices recover from the 50%-below-2025-peak level, which would validate the government's price-support rationale.
• Chalco Boffa Phase 2 expansion financing: whether the 2028 target for 2 million tpa alumina is achieved and whether other Chinese investors follow the refinery model to secure exemptions from the ore export cap.
• The Axis International ICSID case: Guinea's counter-memorial due in September 2026 will clarify the government's legal theory on permit revocations.
• Guinea's political calendar: the Doumbouya government has repeatedly promised a transition to civilian rule; if elections are held in 2026-2027, mining policy could shift.