Overseas bases: the global contest for military access from the Arctic to the Indian Ocean

What it is

The "bases and force posture" beat tracks where countries station troops, ships, and aircraft abroad, which nations grant access rights, and how those arrangements change under political pressure. A base can be a large permanent installation, such as US facilities in Japan or Germany, or a light-footprint agreement giving periodic access to an ally's port. Force posture is the aggregate: how fast a military can reach a crisis, from where, and under what legal terms. Physical location of forces is a leading indicator for where the next crisis will start, because posture changes often precede policy shifts by years.

History

The modern overseas base network took shape in World War II and was institutionalised during the Cold War. At its peak the United States maintained 134 overseas bases in 18 countries, concentrated in West Germany, Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines; the Soviet Union ran a parallel network through Warsaw Pact members and clients in Africa and Asia. After 1991 the US network contracted, then expanded again after the September 2001 attacks. Russia's 2014 annexation of Crimea and the 2022 invasion of Ukraine pushed NATO to reinforce its eastern flank.

China opened its first publicly acknowledged overseas installation at Djibouti in 2017, designated a "logistics support base," marking a shift away from the PLA's historic home-territory doctrine. In April 2025, a second facility became operational at Cambodia's Ream naval base, on the Gulf of Thailand.

Current state

As of mid-2026, the United States operates at least 128 overseas bases across 51 countries, with approximately 67,200 troops permanently assigned in Europe. Japan hosts 113 US military sites, South Korea 83, Germany 174. US strategy is shifting toward "places, not bases": rotational deployments at partner-operated facilities rather than new large permanent installations.

China is pursuing what US officials call "Project 141," targeting at least five overseas bases and ten logistics support sites by 2030. Washington tracks roughly 18 candidate countries. The Ream facility extends China's naval reach toward the Strait of Malacca.

In Europe, the US Army Europe command lost its four-star billet in June 2026 when US Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth blocked General Christopher Donahue's extension and downgraded the post to three stars, per the Donahue removal. Germany is simultaneously weighing Bundeswehr deployments to the Strait of Hormuz, per the Merz-Hormuz reporting.

Relationships

The Overseas Base Race is the macro contest: the United States, China, Russia, France, and India competing for access across Africa, the Indian Ocean, and the Pacific. Indian Ocean Bases tracks its nodes: Djibouti, Ream, Hambantota in Sri Lanka, Diego Garcia in the British Indian Ocean Territory, and India's Andaman and Nicobar Islands command.

Island-Chain Bases covers the first and second island chains framing China's coastal defence planning. Since 2011 the United States has negotiated 12 new Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) sites in the Philippines and Australia. The Australia-Vanuatu Nakamal Agreement of June 2026, barring Chinese military infrastructure in Vanuatu for AU$500 million, is the latest first-island-chain maneuver. AUKUS submarine basing at HMAS Stirling in Western Australia is the long arc, with the acquisition path set at the May 2026 AUKUS ministers' meeting.

Arctic Militarisation follows Norway, Finland, and Sweden's integration into NATO's northern posture alongside Russia's reinvestment at Novaya Zemlya and Franz Josef Land. Himalayan and Tibet Airfields tracks China's high-altitude network along the Line of Actual Control and India's counter-buildout of forward landing grounds. Forward Posture and Rotations covers the legal mechanics: Status of Forces Agreements, Visiting Forces Agreements, rotation schedules. Basing Rights and Access is the diplomatic contest for those frameworks. Homeland Basing and BRAC follows US domestic base management, last revised in the 2005 Base Realignment and Closure round.

What to watch

• Whether China confirms a third overseas base before 2030, with East Africa and the Atlantic coast the most-cited candidate regions.
• The nine Philippine EDCA sites under construction: delivery timelines set how quickly the first-island-chain posture becomes usable.
• US pressure on Denmark for expanded rights at Pituffik Space Base in Greenland (formerly Thule Air Base), with Danish sovereignty resistance firm.
• NATO eastern-flank force posture commitments at the July 7-8, 2026 Ankara summit.