Nuclear forces: nine arsenals, no binding treaty

What it is

The nuclear-forces beat tracks the hardware, doctrine, and arms-control diplomacy of the nine states that hold nuclear weapons as of July 2026. A world-news reader follows it because nuclear posture shifts fast: a new delivery system, a treaty lapse, or an enrichment breakthrough changes the deterrence math between rivals in ways that reshape foreign policy. The beat anchors on three threads: US triad modernization (Sentinel ICBM and B-21 Raider), great-power competition (Russia and China both expanding or uploading their arsenals with no bilateral treaty in force since February 2026), and proliferation at the margins (North Korea, Iran, and the Saudi-Pakistan enrichment question).

History

The nuclear age opened in July 1945 with the first US test at Trinity, New Mexico, and the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The Soviet Union tested in 1949, France in 1960, China in 1964. The 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) recognised five nuclear-weapon states and bound most others to forgo weapons in exchange for civilian nuclear access. The Cold War arsenal peaked near 70,000 warheads in the mid-1980s. From the 1987 INF Treaty through the 2010 New START, the United States and Russia cut deployed strategic warheads by roughly 90 percent. India and Pakistan tested openly in 1998; North Korea withdrew from the NPT in 2003. New START, signed in Prague in April 2010, capped each side at 1,550 deployed strategic warheads and 700 deployed launchers, with mutual on-site inspections. Russia suspended inspections in February 2023; the treaty expired 5 February 2026 with no successor.

Current state

SIPRI counts 12,187 nuclear warheads globally as of January 2026, with roughly 4,012 deployed and between 2,100 and 2,200 on high operational alert. Russia holds an estimated 4,400 military stockpile warheads; the United States holds 3,748 active and inactive warheads. No longer bound by New START, Russia is uploading reserve warheads onto delivery systems (see 뉴스타트 만료 이후 러시아, 일단은 현상 유지). China, estimated at 620 warheads in 2025, is growing fastest, with new silo fields under satellite observation in Xinjiang (see Satellite images show China hardening its nuclear silo fields). The US Congressional Budget Office projects American nuclear modernization at US$946 billion for fiscal years 2025 to 2034, 25 percent above the prior 10-year estimate. The Sentinel ICBM program sits 81 percent over its baseline cost at US$141 billion and targets a first test launch in 2027 (see 센티넬 ICBM, 예산 81% 초과 상태로 여전히 구조조정 중). The B-21 Raider stealth bomber entered combat-focused operational testing in June 2026, years ahead of earlier projections (see B-21 레이더, 예정보다 훨씬 일찍 전투 시험 돌입).

Relationships

The five roster subjects interlock tightly. The Sentinel ICBM is the US triad's land leg, replacing 400 Minuteman III missiles in hardened silos; its Nunn-McCurdy cost breach forced a program restructure and compressed the schedule. The B-21 Raider is the air leg, dual-roling nuclear and conventional weapons; its accelerated combat testing signals Air Force confidence even as Sentinel slips. China's buildup is the planning driver for both: the US Department of Defense projects up to 1,000 Chinese warheads by 2030, and Beijing has declined to join trilateral arms-control talks with Washington and Moscow. New START's expiry removed the verification and data-exchange regime that gave each side insight into the other's posture, leaving both sides with less visibility into upload decisions. Proliferation is the outer ring: North Korea holds roughly 60 assembled warheads and is expanding enrichment capacity (see Kim unveils a new enrichment plant and orders 'exponential' nuclear growth); Iran enriches uranium to 60 percent purity with restricted IAEA access (see 전쟁 이후 사찰관의 눈에서 사라진 이란의 농축 우라늄); and the Saudi Arabia-Pakistan enrichment relationship raises technology-transfer concerns (see Saudi nuclear hedging revives as Riyadh courts US enrichment and Pakistan).

What to watch

The Sentinel ICBM's 2027 first-flight target is the next hard data point on whether the US land leg can recover its schedule gap. SIPRI publishes updated national warhead counts each June; any China figure above 650 narrows the gap with France's declared 290 and strengthens arguments for expanding the US nuclear force. Russia has not publicly announced post-New-START upload numbers; any data exchange with Washington would signal a diplomatic opening. The NPT review process, stalled after the 2022 conference failed to adopt a final document, faces additional strain at its next scheduled meeting. North Korea's enrichment expansion sets a trajectory toward 100-plus warheads within a few years. Any US-Russia bilateral contact setting parameters for a successor framework will be the defining arms-control event of the decade.