CAR's eastern front flares as the AAKG fights on past the disarmament deals
FACA and allies clashed with the Azande Ani Kpi Gbe in Haut-Mbomou, driving civilians into DRC and South Sudan; the UPC and 3R disarmed in 2025 but Bozizé's CPC and new militias keep the war alive
Summary
CAR's war persists on its eastern margins despite progress on disarmament. In January 2026 the Azande Ani Kpi Gbe (AAKG) clashed with government forces and allies in Zémio, Haut-Mbomou, causing civilian casualties and mass displacement into Drc and South Sudan. The UPC and 3R signed disarmament deals with President Touadera in July 2025, and 1,200+ combatants have demobilised since — but UN experts question their durability, and the Coalition of Patriots for Change led by ex-president François Bozizé remains a significant threat. Russian-backed ex-Wagner forces, now folded toward Africa Corps, are deployed across provincial cities and near mines. Crisis Group warns the army itself risks further fragmentation. Touadéra won a third term in December 2025 with 53%+.
By the numbers
- Jan 2026 — AAKG-FACA clashes in Zémio, Haut-Mbomou.
- 1,200+ — combatants disarmed and demobilised since July 2025.
- July 2025 — UPC and 3R sign disarmament agreements with Touadéra.
- Dec 2025 — Touadéra re-elected with 53%+ for a third term.
- DRC + South Sudan — destinations of cross-border displacement.
Why it matters
CAR is a test of whether Russian security backing plus partial disarmament can stabilise a fractured state — or merely freeze it. Continued AAKG fighting and a still-armed CPC under Bozizé show the deals have not reached the peripheries, while army fragmentation and Russia's deepening role keep the conflict and its civilian displacement live.
What to watch
- Whether the AAKG and CPC are drawn into any wider disarmament.
- The shift from Wagner to Kremlin-run Africa Corps and its cost/performance.
- Cross-border displacement straining DRC and South Sudan.
- FACA cohesion and the risk of further fragmentation.