Nigeria's Northeast Insurgency
Nigeria's 17-year jihadist conflict in the northeast, led by ISWAP and Boko Haram, has killed tens of thousands, displaced millions, and entered an escalating phase in mid-2026.
加入列表
还没有列表。
What it is
Nigeria's northeast insurgency is a 17-year armed conflict pitting the Nigerian state and the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) against two jihadist groups: the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) and a rump faction of Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati wal-Jihad (JAS, known internationally as Boko Haram). The conflict is concentrated in Borno, Adamawa, and Yobe (BAY) states, where ISWAP holds rural territory, controls Lake Chad islands, and regularly attacks Nigerian Army bases, civilians, and infrastructure. JAS launched its armed campaign in 2009; in 2015 a splinter faction pledged allegiance to the Islamic State and became ISWAP; in 2021 ISWAP killed JAS leader Abubakar Shekau and absorbed most of his territory. Since late 2024 the two factions have competed for Lake Chad basin control.
History
Boko Haram was founded by Mohammed Yusuf in Maiduguri, Borno State, around 2002 as a Salafi-jihadist movement opposing Western-style secular education. Yusuf was killed in Nigerian police custody in 2009 after a failed uprising; his successor Abubakar Shekau escalated to a full insurgency within months. The group's April 2014 kidnapping of 276 girls from the Government Girls Secondary School in Chibok, Borno, drew global attention and became the defining atrocity of the conflict's first decade. In 2015 the group pledged allegiance to the Islamic State; a breakaway faction under Abu Musab al-Barnawi became ISWAP. Nigeria's military Operation Lafiya Dole, running from 2016 and backed by US surveillance drones and intelligence sharing, retook most towns the insurgency had seized, but ISWAP regrouped in the Lake Chad islands and rural Borno. In mid-2021 Shekau detonated a suicide device rather than surrender to ISWAP, ending JAS's original leadership but not the faction.
Current state
As of mid-2026 the insurgency is in an escalating phase. ISWAP killed 81 villagers in Gubio, Borno on 9 June; at least 20 soldiers and more than 40 civilians in Monguno and Nganzai on 13 June; and on 29 June abducted approximately 50 students and teachers from the Lassa school in Askira/Uba LGA, the third mass school abduction in the northeast since May. UN OCHA's Nigeria 2026 Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan (January 2026) found 5.8 million people in BAY states face acute food insecurity, and projects 3 million children under five across Nigeria will suffer severe acute malnutrition in 2026. ACAPS counted 7,743 conflict fatalities across 1,743 incidents in northeast Nigeria between January 2023 and October 2025. Roughly 4,000 civilians were killed in the first eight months of 2025 alone, matching all of 2023. Niger's withdrawal from the MNJTF in March 2025, following the 2023 coup in Niamey, disrupted cross-border intelligence sharing along the porous Cameroon-Niger-Nigeria-Chad border corridor. The June 2026 killing spree illustrated the gap between official security claims and ground conditions. Humanitarian funding has collapsed: only 1.3% of the US$224.4 million required for food assistance in BAY states in 2026 had been received as of early 2026.
Relationships
ISWAP is formally part of the Islamic State's global network, exploiting IS media channels for recruitment, but is operationally autonomous from central IS leadership. The MNJTF, headquartered in N'Djamena, Chad, coordinates Nigeria, Niger, Cameroon, Chad, and Benin; Niger's 2025 withdrawal has degraded the alliance's intelligence and logistics capacity. A US-Nigeria intelligence-sharing arrangement, which produced a joint strike killing 21 ISWAP fighters in June 2026, partially compensates. Nigeria's Federal Government under President Bola Tinubu has repeatedly claimed security gains in the northeast; critics point to the besieging of army brigade headquarters without air support as evidence of systemic failure. Human Rights Watch's 2026 World Report documents security-force abuses, including extrajudicial killings of suspected militants and civilians, which erode community intelligence cooperation with the military.
What to watch
Whether ISWAP sustains its mid-2026 school-abduction campaign and whether the Nigerian Army can secure examination sites in Borno and Yobe. The JAS-ISWAP competition for Lake Chad islands, and whether one faction consolidates operational dominance. MNJTF cohesion following Niger's withdrawal and any moves toward Niamey's re-engagement. Humanitarian funding: OCHA's 2026 plan requires US$910 million for the northeast; severe shortfalls risk driving food-insecure populations into ISWAP and JAS recruitment pipelines. Political fallout for President Tinubu ahead of Nigeria's 2027 general election, where northeast security is a major vulnerability.